14 Points

In this account, the US government has had many failings. There is the Cuba of 1898. This Cuba had been fighting against an oppressive Spanish colonial rule for thirty years and was poised to win independence, thanks to the inspired brilliance of the rebel leader named José Martí. President McKinley, who defeated the less imperialist incumbent Cleveland, wanted the Spanish out of the American sphere but feared that the promised social reforms and land distribution proclaimed by the rebels would harm American business interests in Cuba (worth $50 million in 1897). American papers emphasized Spanish brutality and the country united behind the slogan “Cuba Libre.” Meanwhile, the new liberal Spanish Prime Minister, Sagasta, wanted to negotiate for peace, but McKinley refused because the result would have been an independent Cuba. As Americans began to see McKinley’s true intentions to take control of Cuba, their support for the war dropped, until Senator Henry Teller offered an amendment explicitly granting Cuba independence from American control. Then 125,000 Americans volunteered to fight for Cuban independence. The victory was remarkably easy, but the US government reneged on its promise and passed a new amendment making Cuban policies and its treasury subject to American review and veto. This sowed the seeds for repressive Cuban administrations (one of which was opposed by FDR leading to a slight improvement). Under the autocratic Batista in 1952, Congressional elections were cancelled, encouraging one young candidate, Fidel Castro, to try a different strategy.

The American takeover of the Philippines was another consequence of their campaign against Spain and its colonies. But this time, the locals refused to accept trading Spanish for US dominance, and the ensuing conflict killed 4,374 American soldiers, 20,000 Philippine civilians, and 16,000 guerillas, in three and a half years of horrific fighting ending in 1902. Reports of reciprocal atrocities were ubiquitous as Americans tortured, raped, and indiscriminately imprisoned. Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, who took up imperialism with a rare degree of alacrity, offered a defense of American forces as one of the necessary challenges of bringing law to a “semi-civilized people with all the tendencies and characteristics of the Asiatics.” Kinzer credits the US for creating, in 1907, the first organized parliamentary elections in Asia, and argues that US imperialism was far more benign than European and Japanese forms. Yet, it was not until 1946 that the US formally relinquished control of the Philippines, and it had no qualms about supporting the dictatorship of Ferdinand Marcos with billions of dollars in aid as the strategic interest of US military bases overwhelmed democratic propriety. His oppressive rule inspired the famous “People Power” movement that eventually forced elections. US presidents up to Ronald Reagan supported him throughout his 20 year rule which ended in 1986. (Marcos is credited (in Wikipedia at least) with bringing economic growth to the Philippines but data from Penn World Tables shows that average GDP per capita growth was a mere 1.4% under Marcos, while it was twice as high during the two decades that preceded his rule).

In Nicaragua, the talented President José Santos Zelaya embarked on an ambitious pro-market development program that sparked growth and investment. Theodore Roosevelt called him “a great and good friend,” but after TR lost to Taft in 1908, Kinzer shows how the new Secretary of State, Philander Know, who had deep business ties with American interests in Latin America, orchestrated Zelaya’s downfall in response to the most trivial of actions: after being bullied for business concessions to American companies, Zelaya sought development loans from European instead of American banks. His overthrow, financed and organized by the State Department and its clients, set up the horrendous Samoza dynasty, which inspired the Sandinista revolution of 1979 and subsequent Contra War. Nicaragua is now the poorest country in Latin America behind Haiti. Zelaya’s only offenses, Kinzer implies, were his aspirations for Nicaraguan and regional prosperity.

Certain Cold War interventions may have been even worse. In Guatemala, Chile, and Iran, the US played decisive roles in expunging democratic governments in favor of dictators, despite CIA and State Department reports advising against such action.

In Guatemala, from 1951 to 1954, a nationalist named Jacobo Arbenz took over the reins from a remarkable leader, Arévalo, who developed key institutions of social welfare and law, replacing a corrupt patron of US businesses, Ubico. Arbenz controlled a National Assembly with only four seats of sixty-one held by Communists and none in his cabinet. His inaugural speech called for a transformation into a “modern capitalist state” and yet, from the arm chairs of Washington DC, Secretary of State J.F. Dulles and his equally zealous brother Allen, who directed the CIA, insisted he was a tool of the Russians. Arbenz’s greatest offense was the passage of the Agrarian Reform Law of 1952, which allowed the government to seize uncultivated land for redistribution so long as the owners were compensated. United Fruit, which cultivated 15% of its land, but held 20% of the country’s, was furious and demanded a compensation offer more than 10 times what they declared on their tax filings. A US-led coup overthrew Arbenz in 1954 setting off decades of civil war.

Allende won the 1970 Chilean election despite CIA and American funding of his primary challenger, but Nixon’s post-election orders to “make the economy scream” destroyed any chance Allende had at developing Chile during his three years of rule, terminating in a US-supported military coup. This was a dramatic reversal of JFK’s development aid program to Chile, which totaled $1.2 billion during the 1960s. Internal opposition to the anti-Allende campaign was vigorous from the Chilean CIA Chief Hecksher and Assistant Secretary of State Charles Meyer. Yet, Sec. of State Kissinger’s contempt for democracy was too much, as seen from his infamous remark, “I don’t see why we need to stand by and watch a country go Communist due to the irresponsibility of its own people.”

Kinzer finds more justification for interventions in Grenada, Panama, Afghanistan, and partially for Iraq (yet only successful transition in Grenada). Still, Kinzer’s interpretation of Iraq is scolding and relies heavily on a recitation of former security advisor Richard Clarke’s arguments. To summarize: the war was at best a distraction from the more serious and justified campaign in Afghanistan; it has provoked untold anti-US hatred, inspired new terrorists, set a dangerous precedent for preventive war, and showed disdained for international cooperation and institutions. Like most critics of the effort, Kinzer makes only vague and unpersuasive allusions to their being other more patient options available (á la the Liberal Realism of George Kennan), such as those used to initiate reforms in the Soviet Union and China, who also eventually emerged from horrific dictators.

Let’s grant for a moment that the USSR and China are suitable analogies for Iraq. Think how many lives were lost in addition to living standards repressed during the long reign of the USSR in Russia, Central Asia, and Eastern Europe? Even taking Kinzer’s own example of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, it cost one million Afghanis their lives, maimed another three million, in addition to 15,000 Soviet deaths. The US’s reasons for avoiding direct confrontation with the USSR had more to do with the wisdom of fear than the virtue of principled patience. Kinzer only mentions China, but we might recall that it wasn’t until after Mao’s death, that the fundamental reforms of 1978 liberalized ownership and incentives, initiating China’s economic takeoff that has begun to melt away the glacier that entraps its civil liberties. Does Kinzer really believe that trade privileges, diplomacy, and aid could have steered Saddam into a tolerable dictator? If so, then it’s not clear why $2 billion in agricultural aid in the 1980s accompanied by diplomatic visits were not sufficient, nor were the billion dollar contracts that French and German companies were signing with Saddam able to deter his persecutions. Even Kinzer acknowledges that the insurgency was not inevitable; he claims that with adequate troop levels and smarter occupation policies it may have been avoided altogether.

Has American foreign policy changed? Narrow interpretations of American foreign interests have never been popular and have always found internal critics, but there is reason to believe such policies are more unacceptable now than ever. Further, American corporate leaders are more diverse and less morally ethnocentric than their predecessors. Amoral “Realism,” understood as the injunction: “enhance our power by oppressing the aspiring,” is recognized by neoconservatives and liberals as leading to utter failure, which is not to say that recent US policies have been significantly more successful or sophisticated. As a whole, Kinzer’s book can be read with optimism; by recalling America’s errors and abuses, Kinzer offers a useful warning of what to avoid and a way to realize what might yet be, despite his weariness over what power entails.

J.T. Rothwell, Editor 14 Points.