The Middle East Today

Yet American and European policymakers will only make headway in recovering the ground they have lost in the region since 2001 if they are willing to recognise the fluid, indeed often counter-intuitive, nature of what constitutes friends and enemies in the wider Middle East.  

Nowhere is this truer than in relation to Iraq.

 

On the one side, remarkably, Saudi Arabia and other longstanding Arab allies of the US have still not established embassies in Baghdad, five years after the overthrow of Saddam. Despite unprecedented prosperity as a result of recent oil price rises, they have refused to forgive either the debts incurred by Saddam Hussein in fighting Iran in the 1980's, or the reparations imposed on his regime for the damage done to Kuwait in 1990. Despite the US’s best diplomatic efforts, they have still not come to terms with the existence of a Shi’a majority, and relatively pluralist, Iraqi state.

 

By contrast, relations between Iraq and Iran are flourishing. President Ahmadinejad’s visit to Baghdad in March led to major new economic agreements between the two countries, building on the burgeoning traffic in people and goods that has developed since 2003.

 

The complexity of the Iran/Iraq/US triangle is further illustrated by the recent statement of Iranian ambassador to Iraq, Hassan Kazemi Qumi, who welcomed the Iraqi Army’s clampdown on rogue Mahdi Army militia in Basra, even as he condemned US incursions into Sadr City in Baghdad.

What explains this apparent contradiction? On the one hand, Iran shares American and British interests in stabilising Iraq, since it now has a more sympathetic government in Baghdad than it has ever had before. On the other, it does not want the US to consolidate its military presence in Iraq, which could be used to threaten its own freedom of manoeuvre in future. For its part, the US shares Iran’s interest in a strong Iraqi government, not least so that it can withdraw most of its forces without another Vietnam-style humiliation.

 

The next years will not be comfortable ones. Yet it would be wrong to assume that chaos will inevitably follow a rapid withdrawal of US combat forces (say over the two years from early 2009). Violent political conflicts are likely for years to come. Providing the unity of the Iraqi armed forces can be maintained, however, there is a real prospect that, over time, Iraq may be able to attain levels of security comparable to those of Lebanon today.

 

Political violence, even the risk of civil war, will likely remain a continuing fact of life, even if well-developed power-sharing and revenue-sharing systems help contain these risks. But dire predictions of the inevitable breakup of Iraq are therefore overblown. Iraqi nationalism remains an important force for stability. Even in the Kurdish north, leaders recognise that autonomy within the Iraqi state provides vital protection against powerful neighbours Turkey and Iran.

 

Transition to a modicum of stability in Iraq will depend crucially on the support of both the US and Iran. One scenario might be where Iran accepts that it is in its interests to ensure strengthened constitutional government in Iraq, provided that this is accompanied by a rapid rundown of the US troop presence on its borders. But it would be prepared to accept continuing close relationships between Iraq and the West, and would not seek to press the former into a Syria-style dependent alliance.

 

Such an arrangement would, most of all, be optimal for Iraqi leaders, seeking to develop their national independence. But, for different reasons, both Iran and the US could perhaps live with it. 

Perhaps the biggest joker in the pack remains the possibility of a strike on Iranian nuclear facilities, by Israel or by the US. It is not clear what the ‘red line’ is that could trigger such a strike, though it could be Iranian withdrawal from the NPT or clear evidence of weapons-grade enrichment. Nor is it clear how Iran would react to such strikes.

 

Certainly, another round of substantial US/Israeli-inflicted civilian casualties would play very badly across the Arab world, in Europe and with public opinion across the world. But perhaps the most consequential damage to the US could be in its relations with the government of Iraq, which has continued to emphasise its reluctance to take sides in the conflict between its two most important partners. A strike on Iran, approved by the US, would make it very difficult for the Iraqi Government to sit on the fence. It might not be able to survive were it to side with Washington.  One of the casualties of US support for strikes on Iran, therefore, could be the chances of a relatively smooth withdrawal from Iraq.